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By Ralph Hua∗

I. INTRODUCTION
On December 25, 2009 the Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, after a closed trial 1, issued a guilty
verdict and eleven-year sentence to Mr. Liu Xiaobo 2, a Chinese
scholar, for the crime of “inciting subversion of state power.” 3
∗
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1 See Andrew Jacobs, Trial in China Signals Attack on Dissidents, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/world/asia/24china.html.
2 Mr. Liu Xiaobo was recently awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize on
October
8,
2010.
See
The
Nobel
Peace
Prize,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/announcement.html (last visited
Nov. 29, 2010).
3 Case Update: International Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict, Human Rights In China (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision%5fid=173860&item%5fid=172713 [hereinafter The

1
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The conviction arose from a manifesto called “Charter 08,”
which promotes a series of political reforms in China. 4 Mr. Liu,
who previously wrote numerous articles criticizing the political
system and other social issues in China, was one of the main
drafters of this manifesto. Despite the fact that none of his articles or the underlying manifesto incites real violence against
either the regime or any individual, the court, without any discussion of the legal merits other than citing the titles and brief
quotes from Mr. Liu’s articles, found that his articles were
“slander” and “incite others to overthrow [the] country’s state
power and the socialist system.” 5 Without engaging in any
form of balancing test or analysis regarding the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech, the court simply concluded,
“Liu Xiaobo’s actions have obviously exceeded the freedom of
speech category and constitute criminal offense.” 6
The guilty verdict from the closed trial and the omission of
sufficient legal analysis by the court should not come as a surprise. Mr. Liu, a famous veteran of the 1989 Tiananmen
Square protest, stood almost no chance of acquittal as soon as
the prosecutors pressed this latest charge against him 7 more
than a year before his trial. In this case, the Chinese court did
exactly what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always
expected it to do: quash dissenting voices swiftly with or without legal analysis. The Chinese court also, as expected, faithfully played the role of guardian of the “socialist system,” a
highly abstract term that is a top priority under the Chinese
Constitution. 8
Verdict].
4 Charter 08, Open Letter from Yu Haocheng et. al., Human Rights in
China (Dec. 9, 2008) translation available at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision%5fid=173861&item%5fid=85717.
5 The Verdict, supra note 3.
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Liu was previously sentenced to two years in prison and three years of
“reeducation through labor” for his writings. See Pen American Center, China: Liu Xiaobo, http://www.pen.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/3029/prmID/172
(last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
8 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (1982) (China), available at
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm (“The socialist system is
the basic system of the People's Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist
system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”).
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Mr. Liu’s actual fate might be the same as thousands of
dissidents before him. His case, however, differs from the majority of the old generation of political charges in at least two
aspects. First, the statute under which he was convicted is
found under the chapter “Crimes Endangering National Security,” a newly enacted chapter with facially politically-neutral
crimes rather than the old “Counterrevolution Crimes”. 9
Second, his case is an example of the CCP’s increasing wariness of public involvement in politically sensitive charges,
which is a departure from the practice of openly accusing counterrevolution offenders of decades ago, especially shortly after
1989.
This article explores the Chinese government’s arsenal for
persecution of political dissenters. It also explores the subsequent detrimental effect it has had on the stability of Chinese
society as well as the causal link between the hard line approach to dissent and the increasing social unrest.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL OFFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA
Unlike its European counterparts that have had long periods of liberalism toward political offenders 10, China has
shown almost no moment of such leniency toward offenders directly or indirectly challenging the ruling authority during its
two thousand-year history. The dozen major dynasties in China’s history each lasted for an average of two centuries during
which time uniformity and power concentration was always a
commonly shared and essential feature of the dynasties. 11 Un9 See Human Rights in China & Human Rights Watch/Asia, China:
Whose Security? “State Security” in China's New Criminal Code 2 (1997),
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Security.pdf.
10 NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, REBELS WITH A CAUSE: THE MINDS AND MORALITY
OF POLITICAL OFFENDERS 168 (Westview Press 2000). “Papadatos suggested
that the new liberal attitudes toward political offenders were a product of the
revolutions in the first half of the nineteenth centry. Since ‘[t]he parties in
power had found themselves alternately conquerors and vanquished,’ Papadatos wrote, ‘political offenders seemed unlucky players rather than criminals.” Id.
11 See ARTHUR COTTERELL & DAVID MORGAN, CHINA'S CIVILIZATION: A
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like Europe, which had long been in a decentralized state after
the fall of the Roman Empire and no ruler from any individual
country had the administrative capacity to rule a substantial
part, if not the whole, of Europe for an extensive period of time,
each of China’s major dynasties throughout history controlled
vast flatlands through which the emperor’s army could march
unhindered. 12 During feudalism, European rulers did not possess absolute power because most of the landowning classes
were independent.
The king of France, for example, was considered only a duke in
Brittany and had limited authority in that region for hundreds of
years. In practice if monarchs wanted to do anything - start a
war, build a fort - they had to borrow and bargain for money and
troops from local chieftains, who became earls, viscounts, and
dukes in the process. 13

China ended this kind of decentralized feudalism as early
as around 221 B.C., when the Qin Dynasty unified China after
the Warring States Period. 14 A Chinese emperor became not
only the ruler of every single person in his dominion, but also
the owner of every inch of the land, and thus, an authority that
bargained with no one. 15 For long periods of time, the rulers of
SURVEY OF ITS HISTORY, ARTS, AND TECHNOLOGY, at 309 (Praeger Publishers
1975) (Outlining chronology of Chinese history with main dynasties);
CHARLES O. HUCKER, CHINA'S IMPERIAL PAST: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE
HISTORY AND CULTURE 55 (Stanford Univ. Press 1975). “The Chinese world
should be united under a single Son of Heaven, and his control should be effectively centralized.” Id.
12 FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT
HOME AND ABROAD 36-37 (1st ed. 2003).
13 Id. at 37.
14 COTTERELL & MORGAN, supra note 11, at 47. “By 221 B.C….[i]n place of
the old feudal system of government belonging to the Classical Age a centralized monarchy was established.” Id.
15 CHARLES O. HUCKER, CHINA'S IMPERIAL PAST: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CHINESE HISTORY AND CULTURE 56-57 (Stanford Univ. Press 1975). “The ruler
was administrator, military leader, judge, manager of the economy, priest,
educator, and moral exemplar. His responsibility was total. Accordingly, his
authority had to be unlimited; and the Chinese polity came to be organized in
such a way that the ruler’s authority was totalitarian in practice.” Id.;
MICHAEL LOEWE, IMPERIAL CHINA 199 (Praeger Publishers 1965). “It was held,
all arable land had been the property of the monarch. The principle implies
that land cannot be acquired by purchase, as ownership and the right of disposal is vested solely in the sovereign.” Id.
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European countries not only had to bargain with their own
dukes but also had to tie, whether tightly or loosely, their legitimacy with the church. A Chinese emperor, on the contrary,
was a self-proclaimed “Son of Heaven,” whose legitimacy was
as self-evident as the heaven itself. 16 One example demonstrates this striking difference: King Henry VIII, in order to divorce Catherine of Aragon and marry Anne Boleyn, had to annul his marriage and later break away from the Catholic
Church, at the cost of creating internal strife and external invasion. The Chinese emperors, however, never needed to seek
confirmation from a religious institution nor foreign sovereign.
This historical background is certainly helpful in understanding the general psychology behind the persecution of political offenders in China. As a ruler of a dynasty that had
lasted for a century and was likely to last for many more, he
(and very occasionally she) saw no need for leniency toward
those who challenged or questioned the highest authority. In
other words, the “confidence level” of the ruling class was often
so high that they did not think a “safety clause,” warranted any
consideration, i.e. treating political offenders courteously today
so that if the regime was ever overthrown, the rulers themselves would receive reciprocal leniency. 17
Although modern China is no longer ruled by a feudal emperor, China is undoubtedly still a totalitarian regime. The
justification for the ruling party is no longer the “Son of Heaven” argument, but rather a more carefully crafted “people’s
representative” argument, i.e. the leading power is no longer a
self-proclaimed godly figure, but rather a self-proclaimed class
of protectors of the people’s interest. 18 Despite this difference,
the current regime is not that different from the past ones. It
16 HUCKER, supra note 15, at 55. “The Chinese world should be united
under a single Son of Heaven, and his control should be effectively centralized.” Id.
17 KITTRIE, supra note 10.
18 PIERRE M. PERROLLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY 6 (International Arts And Sciences Press 1976). “The great leader
Chairman Mao has also pointed out that ‘the Communist Party is a political
party which works in the interest of the nation and people and which has absolutely no private ends to pursue.’” Id.
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still holds all the major bargaining chips and has no formidable
bargaining opponent. The regime owns every inch of land in
China and what is on the real estate market are not land ownership rights, but only rights to lease land from the government. 19 The CCP has a monopoly in all aspects of politics and
policy making. There is no realistic check on government power, as the legitimacy of the ruling party is not decided by an
outside source or any independent means, but is rather selfevident simply because it is a “people’s party.” Challenging the
party, therefore, automatically means, at least on its face, challenging the people. Unlike the political offenders in western
Europe who, for a long period of time, had been viewed as noble
offenders providing alternatives on how a society should be
run, the offenders in China are pictured as sinister conspirators who target nothing but the people. 20 For example, in Mr.
Liu’s guilty verdict, the court, though making no false factual
allegation, used a limited, yet significantly colored term of art
to portray the defendant as one who had a grudge against society. The court stated that Mr. Liu committed these crimes
“due to his dissatisfaction with the political and socialist system of our country’s people’s democratic dictatorship.” 21 This
language, especially in the special context of the Chinese language, shows that the court found nothing noble about this offender, who instead of feeling lucky and satisfied with the great
people’s society as any reasonable person would do, chose to
poison the health of the society. It is, therefore, reasonably foreseeable that these kinds of “undeserving” offenders are not
19 See Xiaogang Deng, Lening Zhang & Andrea Leverentz, The Dual System of Land Use Policy and Its Related Problems in Contemporary China, in
CHINA IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION: UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY STATE AND
SOCIETY ACTORS 79-84 (Reza Hasmath & Jennifer Hsu eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2009).
20 Theodore H.E. Chen, The Chinese Communist Regime: A Brief Review,
in COMMUNIST CHINA 30 (Yung Wei ed., Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company 1972). “A campaign for the ‘suppression of counterrevolutionaries’ was
launched in the latter part of 1950, and the ensuring months saw a crescendo
of mass trials, mass executions, and wholesale persecution of all who were
believed or suspected to be hostile to the new regime … These campaigns
against the ‘enemies of the people’ left no doubt among the people that the
Communist would brook no interference with what they were setting out to
do.” Id.
21 The Verdict, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
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likely to get the leniency in China that their counterparts in
Europe receive.
Portraying itself as the eternal representative of the people
is the foundational tradition of the China’s ruling party. The
party’s ruling philosophy and policy priorities are often reflected in the form of policy directives from the President, who is also the chairman of the party. In 2006, the current President,
faced with a booming Chinese economy with the type of momentum challenging the top players in the international community, called “for the creation of a ‘harmonious society.’” 22 A
term this vague needs interpretation, a large part of which has
been accomplished through the actual treatment of dissidents.
This call for a more harmonious and stable society has turned
out to be an effective “preemptive strike” against dissidents.
Rather than creating a society in which people can harmoniously and freely express their views publicly, this directive in
fact encourages silencing dissidents and, therefore, creates a
debate-free realm. The directive also goes a step further by explaining why the dissidents are enemies and how they can
create harm by destabilizing the society, even though the vast
majority of the speculated harm is really debatable. Additionally, this directive also indicates that the government should
not only focus on the dissenting mind, but also dissenting conduct. The government is no longer interested in interfering in
citizens’ private lives and digging out their dissenting thoughts
or attitudes. It now focuses on capturing actions and labeling
them as real threats to society. When faced with the half-acentury-old international criticism of its persecution of dissidents, it is now easier for the Chinese government to fire back
with the simple argument that the defendants are not simply
political dissidents who targeted the heads of the regime, but
rather criminals whose actions could have caused real harm to
society.
To its credit, China has moved away from wanton persecu22 See Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority:
“Harmonious Society”, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR2006101101610.html.
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tion of people merely based on their social status or family
background, as was the practice before and during the Cultural
Revolution. 23 When a booming economy not only strengthens,
but also arguably legitimizes the rule of party leadership, persecuting random citizens merely for “leading a capitalistic lifestyle” is clearly out of date, unnecessary, and perceived harmful to the regime itself. China has also emerged as one of the
key players on the international stage, and as a result, the regime has tried to keep up with various international standards
at least at the de jure level. For example, it has signed, though
not yet completely ratified, many international conventions regarding civil, human, and refugee rights. 24 The persecutions of
political offenders in China, however, have never ceased even
with the world’s acceptance of China. Although in recent decades, open trials against the “anti-revolution culprits” have
been a very rare event, persecution of political offenders has
instead evolved into closed trials with non-ideologically-related
charges. The open involvement of the party in these persecutions has been reduced and replaced with the judiciary utilizing
ambiguous and overly broad statutes. 25 During the ancient
dynasties, open execution and even public torture of dissidents
served as a deterrence and maintained the status quo. During
modern times, the ruling party, for the purpose of efficiency
and apparent civility as well as its lack of confidence in ideology monopoly, has only been interested in finding a convenient
and civil way, not necessarily the most brutal way, to silence
dissenting voices. The government now puts its trust in the
judiciary, a branch that has a very limited degree of independence especially in political cases, in order to maintain status
quo by having it utilize China’s questionable Constitution and
23 BAOGANG GUO AND SUJIAN GUO, CHINA IN SEARCH OF A HARMONIOUS
SOCIETY: Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development 3 (Lexington
Books 2008). “The emphasis on social harmony and stability represents a
break away from the era of political campaign and class struggle and transition from a revolutionary party to a governing party.” Id.
24 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Core United Nations Documents Signed, Ratified, or Acceded to by China,
http://cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/inthrol/index.php.
25 See Human Rights in China & Human Rights Watch/Asia, China:
Whose Security? “State Security” in China's New Criminal Code 2 (1997),
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Security.pdf.

CHINA’S ARSENAL OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION - A
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
9
the series of “National Security Laws.” The CCP expects the
“harmonious society” directive to deliver satisfactory results in
sensitive cases not for an ideological battle, but for maintaining
the status quo. The result, as shown in Mr. Liu’s case, has
lived up to the CCP’s expectations so far.
III. THE MODERN TOOLS OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION
A. The Chinese Constitution
The mere fact that a regime has a Constitution does not
automatically guarantee that the rights and privileges found in
that document can be effectively protected in real life. In many
totalitarian regimes, a document with the title “The Constitution” serves more of a propaganda function rather than dividing and limiting powers at a substantive level. This type of
“Stalin Constitution” guarantees the permanent dominance of
the drafters, oftentimes the regime itself, rather than guaranteeing a peaceful and orderly change of administration. 26 The
true value of the Constitution should be seriously questioned
when the constitutionality of the government’s policies is never
formally questioned as well as when legislation, having language and effects that clearly contradict stated principles and
provisions in the Constitution, is never struck down as unconstitutional.
The concept of the Constitution, recognized by liberal democratic countries as a power limiting “social contract,” has never been widely accepted under China’s regime. Also, the concept of “rule of law” in China differs from that in most
constitutional democracies. As Jerome Cohen pointed out in
one of his speeches, “the simplest and best [definition for the
term ‘rule of law’] is ‘government under law.’” 27 However, the
26 WILLIAM C. KIRBY, The Chinese Party-State Under Dictatorship and
Democracy on the Mainland and on Taiwan, in REALMS OF FREEDOM IN
MODERN CHINA 113, 117 (William C. Kirby ed., 2004) (quoting Joseph Stalin,
“if there is no constitution . . . enemies can charge that you have seized power
by force. They could say that the government was imposed on the people . . .
you should take this weapon away from your enemies.”). Id.
27 UCtelevision, Jerome Cohen: Is There Law in China? Is There Justice?,
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term “rule of law” in China often relates to the legalist view of
how society should function with laws provided by the rulers. 28
The laws are designed to make citizens behave and act how the
regime wants them to. Under this view of the “law,” the private individual has no legitimate civil rights and personal freedom must not in any way challenge the ruler’s reign. In this
case, the ruler is the CCP. Under this view, all laws are essentially directives from above that maintain social order for the
ruler. The entity that gives these directives, in the form of
laws, is not bound by any form of “social contract” that would
limit the laws and policies the regime could legally enact. The
CCP, therefore, need neither comply with the “law” nor the
Constitution.
The Chinese Constitution is a product of a regime that is
unwilling to limit its powers and subject itself to checks and
balances. The Preamble summarizes the “great victory” led by
the CCP and Article 1 under the First Chapter describes that
the Constitution is essentially a tool that unconditionally affirms and legitimizes the ruling party’s political power. 29 Article 1 states:
[t]he People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and
based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system by any organization or individual
is prohibited. 30

This clause achieves two important goals. First, it covertly
identifies the CCP as the sole leading political entity of the nation. Also, its position is not subject to challenge provided this
YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2008), 22:34, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1JG4jpY42o.
28 JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR
FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 40 (American Bar Association 3d ed. 2010).
“Overall, the Rule of Law (fazhi) in ancient China is characterized as a Rule
of Man (renzhi); the law was designed for the benefit of those governing, rather than as an instrument of divine sanction or supreme authority. To the
legalist, the ruler was above the law.” Id.
29 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] Preamble (1982) (China), available at
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm.
30 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (1982) (China), available at
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm.

CHINA’S ARSENAL OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION - A
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
11
version of the Constitution is valid. Since the CCP is the only
political party in China that claims to be the sole representative of the working class, and no other political party, either legally or illegally formed, has the ability or the legitimacy to
challenge its position, the CCP can simply point to Article 1 of
the Constitution, which was drafted under the supervision of
the CCP, and prove its own legitimacy. It is, of course, a circular argument for a self-proclaimed power. However, even
pointing out the fallacy of this circular argument can potentially be a violation of the Constitution because the second function of this article effectively prohibits such doubt, which can
arguably constitute “disruption of the socialist system.” This
second function limits the remaining constitutional provisions
as well as all laws and regulations.
The conceptual vagueness of “disruption of the socialist
system” makes it impossible to challenge any decision made by
the CCP. What constitutes “disruption of the socialist system”
is difficult to determine. First, there is the issue of what qualifies as a “disruption” under the Constitution. For example,
does a “disruption” include a law or activity that has realistic
likelihood of interfering with the system or would it encompass
any form of disagreement with the system, however ineffective
the disruption is in toppling the system? Second, what really
constitutes a “socialist system” is a myth. It should not come
as a surprise that party leaders, scholars, and common citizens
might have very different interpretations of “socialism” and
may disagree as to whether the country is still on the “socialist
path.” However, the final say lies exclusively in the hands of
the CCP. It virtually puts itself above the People’s Congress,
the legislative body that is supposed to make no law that ever
“disrupts the socialist system.”
The first article of the Chinese Constitution renders all of
the other rights below it de jure limited rights. In contrast,
constitutional rights in other countries appear unqualified
throughout their constitutions. Even the unqualified rights in
other constitutions are still subject to some kind of “balancing
test” from time to time. However, the more obvious the restrictive language and the more powerful the underlying restric-
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tion, the less basic the rights become. The very fact that some
constitutions choose to leave their basic rights unqualified, at
least textually, is probably due to the fear that any written and
settled restriction within the constitutions might render these
rights less fundamental. However, the basic line of logic of the
Chinese Constitution, as reflected by the Preamble and Article
1, is that all rights are at least subject to the scrutiny of the
survival of the “socialist system.” Once there is a conflict, the
socialist system must triumph. It is also important to note that
this Constitution probably never contemplates any conflict regarding this issue among the Government, People’s Congress,
and the Court. The language is in fact directed against individual citizens and other organizations. 31 Due to the CCP’s position at the top of the hierarchy of power, the political
branches in China have maintained almost perfect harmony
when it comes to politically sensitive cases. The People’s Congress has never passed legislation that has later been found
“anti-socialist.” The Court never engages in any analysis of the
constitutionality of enacted laws and has instead always faithfully applied them, especially in politically sensitive cases.
Even where it should constitute judicial misconduct to reduce
the legal analysis regarding freedom of speech issues to something as brief as “[the] actions have obviously exceeded the
freedom of speech category,” 32 the Court has always refrained
from providing meaningful guidelines in many constitutional
cases. This reluctance in meaningful adjudication in political
cases makes the Court’s decisions unclear to the readers.
The following case from Singapore involving the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, serves as an example of
how some explicitly restrictive language in a constitution can
reduce an arguably basic right to one that is at the mercy of
lawmakers.
Article 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore
guarantees its citizens freedom of speech. Section 1(a) of Article 14 provides that “every citizen of Singapore has the right
31 See id. (“Disruption of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”) (emphasis added).
32 The Verdict, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
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to freedom of speech and expression.” 33 This freedom, however,
is explicitly limited by Section 2 of Article 14, which states
that:
Parliament may by law impose . . . on the rights conferred by
clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges of
Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation
or incitement to any offence. 34

This constitutional provision is very different from one in
which the freedom of speech provision is unqualified, for example, as in the US Constitution. Likewise, in the Chinese Constitution, there is no textual limitation immediately relating to
the clause regarding freedom of speech. 35 However, Article 1’s
“disruption of socialist system” language explicitly limits all
rights. Therefore, when it comes to restricting some rights in
the Constitution, China’s “covert” restriction in fact functions
very similarly to Singapore’s “overt” restrictions.
In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, a foundational freedom of expression case, the Court of Appeal of
Singapore explains the relationship between a right in the
Constitution and the possibility of it being limited or even repealed. 36 Jeyaretnam involves the suicide of Teh, an official of
the People’s Action Party. The People’s Action Party was the
party in power at the time of the litigation. Shortly before his
suicide, Teh was publicly under investigation for corruption
charges. Following the news of Teh’s suicide, Jeyaretnam,
leader of the Worker’s Party and appellant in this case, made a
33 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE, art. 14, § 1(a) available
at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved-CONST&date=latest&method=part.
34 Id. art. 14, § 2(a).
35 See XIAN FA art. 35 (1982) (China), available at http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm “Citizens of the People’s Republic
of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession and of demonstration.” Id art. 1.
36 See Benjamin v. Yew, [1992] 2 SLR 310 (Court of Appeal) available at
http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/9713.html.

14 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 2:4
2010]
public speech in front of his political supporters. Jeyaretnam
questioned why the government had not conducted an inquiry
into how Mr. Teh obtained the unusual poison he had used to
commit suicide. Furthermore, Jeyaretnam wanted to know
how the Prime Minister, the respondent in this case, had responded to Teh’s letter to him one day prior to the suicide in
which Teh had written “I will do as you advise.” 37 The respondent sued for defamation alleging that the appellant’s speeches
“‘were understood to mean that the plaintiff was guilty of dishonourable and/or criminal conduct.’” 38 In his appeal, the appellant cited “constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of
speech in other jurisdictions, such as Canada, India and the
United States,” and relied heavily on the decision of New York
Times v. Sullivan. 39 He argued that:
the speech made … was a publication concerning the official conduct of the respondent as Prime Minister or the performance of
his duties as such; that the appellant had a legitimate interest in
the subject matter of his speech, and that the publication was
made to those having a corresponding and legitimate interest,
and hence the occasion in which the publication was made was
privileged. 40

After reviewing New York Times v. Sullivan and the other foreign cases cited by the appellant, the court held that it was
“unable to follow” those decisions. 41 The court reviewed the
First Amendment of the US Constitution and found that “[n]o
such express prohibition [which prohibits Congress from making any laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’
exists] in art 14 of our [the Singapore] Constitution. 42 The
court found that Section 2 of Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution explicitly placed two categories of restrictions upon freedom of speech:
first, such restrictions as it considers necessary and expedient in
Id. para. 11.
Id. para. 13.
39 Id. para. 43.
40 Id. para. 44.
41 Id. para. 56.
42 Benjamin v. Yew, [1992] 2 SLR 310, para. 56 (Court of Appeal), available at http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/9713.html.
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the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof,
friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality;
and second, restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any offence. 43

The court held that, in the context of defamation, freedom of
speech is completely at the mercy of the Parliament:
[w]hile the first category of restrictions must satisfy the test of
necessity and expediency in the interest of the various matters
specified therein, the second category of restrictions is not required to satisfy any such test. Thus, Parliament is empowered
to make laws to impose on the right of free speech restriction designed to provide against defamation. 44

The court further pointed out that the limitation provision in
Section 2 of Article 14 is broad. 45 Comparing Article 14 with
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the
court noted that the Singapore limitation provision does not include the requirement “necessary in a democratic society” as is
found in Article 10. 46
In this case, the Singapore court essentially approved a
quick two-part analysis. First, it must be determined whether
the Constitution allows Parliament to enact the statute that
convicted the defendant, and if so, then it must be determined
whether the defendant is guilty under this statute. As for the
issue of whether the right to freedom of speech can be repealed
by Parliament, it requires no discussion in the Singapore court
because the answer is obvious: the Constitution explicitly answers this question in the affirmative. Freedom of speech in
Singapore is not a right that requires extensive tests and scrutiny of those laws that restrict it. This Constitution renders
such a right no more different than the legal freeway speed
limit, both can be easily regulated by legislation. In this sense,
the Singapore court did exactly what the Constitution requires
it to do by upholding Parliament’s law and refusing to weigh it
43

Id.
Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
44
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against any “constitutional right.”
Likewise, when the Chinese court charges a defendant for
violating a statute that supposedly has the purpose of protecting the socialist ideology, the government, or both, the court
will most likely deem it irrelevant to consider whether such a
statute is unconstitutional because the Constitution has a clear
position on socialism. It is logical for the court to uphold a statute that promotes and preserves the CCP’s interest, i.e. the
socialist system because that is what the Constitution mandates. In this aspect, the Chinese court, like the Singapore
court, is indeed closely following the Constitution.
B. The Court’s Lack of Independence
Not all express limitations on constitutional rights in the
constitutions render them easy and effective tools to silence
dissent. It greatly depends on what the limitation is and who
is deciding the issue. The latter involves the issue of judicial
independence. A limitation clause can be broadly drafted in
the Constitution yet, if the judiciary has the power to independently hold that there is no nexus between the defendant’s action and the limitation clause, many forms of political dissent
may be permissible.
For example, Germany’s Basic Law has an express limitation clause regarding freedom of expression. It states that
“[t]hese rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and
in the right to personal honour.” 47 What constitutes “personal
honor” is vague and largely undefined. A good faith criticism of
a person’s conduct could arguably be viewed as an attack on
personal honor if the criticism was somehow humiliating. This
limitation clause has the potential of creating an enormous
chilling effect on expressions that convey any negativity about
an individual. The German Federal Constitutional Court,
however, did not allow this broad language in its Basic Law to
turn into a catch-all restriction. It has held that “[t]he basic
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ]
[GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. V(2) (Ger.), available at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
47
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right to freedom of expression, the most immediate aspect of
the human personality in society, is one of the most precious
rights of man,” 48 and thus
general laws which have the effect of limiting a basic right must
be read in the light of its significance and always be construed so
as to preserve the special value of this right, with, in a free democracy, a presumption in favour of freedom of speech in all
areas, and especially in public life. 49

Had the German court been controlled or heavily influenced by
a government that sees political disagreement as a form of
“dishonor” or “disruption,” the holding, which put a high value
on the right to freedom of expression concerning public matters, most likely would have been different.
Ideally, a higher degree of independence of the Chinese
courts may still be able to cure the restrictive attitude toward
dissent created by Article 1 of the Constitution. Arguably, even
if the socialist system must be protected, many actions may not
rise to the level of “disruption.” In Mr. Liu’s case, for example,
although he wrote many articles critical of the government, all
of his articles are banned from publication within China, censored on the Internet and, therefore, their circulation within
China were limited to only a small group of dissidents. 50 In his
statement of defense, Mr. Liu argued that “[his] articles do not
contain any language inciting violence, nor can they realistically incite violence because [he] published those articles on foreign websites that cannot be accessed from China without using any bypassing technology.” 51 Mr. Liu also pointed out that
“his articles and ‘Charter 08’ contain no content of ‘defamation
48 Bundesverfassungsgericht BVERFGE [Federal Constitutional Court]
Jan. 15, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVERFGE] 198 (Ger.), translated in Foreign Law Translations, INST. FOR
TRANSNATIONAL LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=1477.
49 Id.
50 Liu Xiaobo An Yishen Bianhu Ci, (刘晓波案一审辩护词) [Statement of
the Defendant in the First Trial of Liu Xiaobo], DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. 4,
2010) [hereinafter Statement of the Defendant] http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5075054,00.html.
51 Id.
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or libel,’ . . . because they reflect Mr. Liu’s own personal political opinions, which are his personal ‘value judgment,’ rather
than ‘statements of facts.’” 52 The court, however, not only ignored and refused to address these legitimate defenses, but also set up unreasonable procedural obstacles for the defendant.
During the oral argument, instead of allotting an equal amount
of time for each side, the Chief Judge stated that the defendant’s time should not exceed the prosecutor’s time, however
long the latter might be. 53 As was pointed out by the defense
attorney, this arbitrary rule created the bizarre possibility that
“the defendant might only have a few seconds for his oral argument if the prosecutor simply stated ‘we respectfully request
this Court to give harsh punishment to the defendant,’ a
statement of which would only last no more than a few
seconds.” 54 During the defendant’s statement in oral argument, the Chief Judge also interrupted Mr. Liu as he mentioned that “his life journey made a turn in June 1989.” 55 The
Chief Judge stated, “please do not elaborate on the ‘6.4 Incident.’” 56 Public discussion of the “6.4 Incident,” or what is more
commonly known as the “Tiananmen Massacre,” is taboo in
China. However, the court’s quick self-censorship over this issue during a closed trial while the defendant was merely mentioning a date rather than expanding on any of the substantive
events that occurred during that incident, indicates the court’s
low degree of independence from the CCP’s political influence.
The Chinese court’s lack of independence from political influence is a result of the Chinese Constitution’s design. As
Stephanie Balme has pointed out, on the issue of judicial independence, “the … Constitution is essentially contradictory. On
the one hand, it declares and ensures the supremacy of the ruling party. On the other hand, it proclaims that ‘judicial power
should be exercised independently.’” 57 This latter clause makes
52

Id.
Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Statement of the Defendant, supra note 50.
57 Stéphanie Balme, Local Courts in Western China: The Quest for Independence and Dignity, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 154, 161 (Randall
Peerenboom ed., 2010).
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it seem that the Constitution does promote judicial independence. However, putting it in the context of the CCP’s power
monopoly, and the fact that, as was also pointed out by Ms.
Balme, Article 128 of the Constitution states “[l]ocal people’s
courts at different levels are responsible to the organs of state
power which created them,” 58 as well as the important fact that
“the vast majority of [the Chinese judges] are party members,” 59 it is reasonable to argue that this requirement for “independently exercising judicial power,” merely requires the appearance of independence, especially in politically sensitive
cases. Decisions are sufficiently “independent” as long as the
verdicts come from the court and are signed by the judges.
This is regardless of the fact that the judges may have had confidential communications with party leaders or the fact that
many judges, as party members themselves, have been actively
self-censoring their rulings, as was shown in Mr. Liu’s case.
The Constitution’s text does not explicitly prohibit the CCP
from influencing the court. In Article 5, the Constitution lists
“all political parties” in parallel with “all state organs, the
armed forces, … public organizations, and all enterprises and
institutions” when it comes to abiding the Constitution. 60 In
Article 126, the clause that establishes judicial independence,
the Constitution only states that the judiciary is not subject to
interference by “any administrative organ, public organization
or individual,” 61 leaving out “political parties.” The reality is
consistent with this textual design: the court not only aligns itself with the party in politically sensitive cases, but is also very
explicit and often outspoken about the judiciary’s duty to follow
the party. Several past and current Chief Justices of the Supreme People’s Court have announced or written articles pledging allegiance to the CCP. The current Chief Justice, Wang
Shengjun, in his recent article published in Qiushi, a journal of
58 XIAN FA [CONSTITUTION] art. 128 (1982) (China), available at
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm.
59 Id. at 164.
60 XIAN FA art. 5 (1982) (China), available at http://english.gov.cn/200508/05/content_20813.htm.
61 Id. art. 126.
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the Central Committee of the CCP, argued that whether the
judiciary can play a larger role in maintaining social order directly affects the “[Communist] Party’s ruling position.” 62 He
concluded his article with an unequivocal statement about the
judiciary’s position under the CCP,
[t]he People’s Court must firmly support the Party’s leadership,
and push forward its work … , with the Party and the country’s
overall interest at the center; it must timely report its work to
the Party, and closely use the leadership of the Party to face difficulties and problems in its work. 63

C. The “National Security Laws”
In China, the days have passed when political offenders
were forcibly marched to the streets and publicly denounced
and ridiculed, as these “struggle sessions” do not fit China’s
new international image. Political offenders are also no longer
confronted with the minute details as to how their political
views go against communist or socialist doctrines and why they
should, therefore, wholeheartedly embrace the chance of reeducation. Economic growth is becoming the main, if not the only
priority. Social stability and continuing the monopoly of power
are major directives of the CCP. 64 For these reasons, quick and
quiet disposal of political dissidents, rather than belabored
open ideological battles with them, is preferred by the ruling
party. In 1997, the year when the United Kingdom returned
Hong Kong to China, “counterrevolution crimes” started to disappear from the Criminal Code and were replaced with a series
of laws criminalizing acts that threaten national security. 65
62 Shengjun Wang, Push Forward the Three Key Tasks to Achieve New
Development
in
the
Work
of
the
People's
Court,
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2010/201014/201007/t20100713_39319.htm.
63 Id.
64 GUO & GUO, supra note 23, at 3. “The emphasis on social harmony and
stability represents a break away from the era of political campaign and class
struggle and transition from a revolutionary party to a governing party. In
this sense, the party is increasingly interested in enhancing its governing capacity and in search of new sources of political legitimacy.” Id.
65 See Human Rights in China & Human Rights Watch/Asia, China:
Whose Security? “State Security” in China's New Criminal Code 2 (1997),
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Security.pdf.

CHINA’S ARSENAL OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION - A
DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
21
This is a further step toward “depoliticizing” political persecutions.
Mr. Liu was convicted under Article 105 Section 2 of the
Chinese Criminal Code. 66 This statute criminalizes spreading
rumors, slander, or other acts that incite to subvert the power
of the state or overthrow the socialist system. 67 The new law’s
language is so broad that it can effectively cover offenses both
with and without specific anti-regime intent. In many cases, a
petition or an appeal for reform, however peaceful the method
or sincere the language is, can be held as a form of “subversion”. Mr. Liu’s case is one such example.
There have been several recent cases similar in nature
where the defendants, many of them human rights activists,
have been convicted merely for their writings criticizing the
Chinese Government. In 2008, Hu Jia was convicted under
“inciting subversion of state power and the socialist system” for
his open letters and articles criticizing the Government’s human rights record before the Beijing Olympics. 68 In February
2010, Tan Zuoren, an activist seeking to document shoddy constructions that contributed to deaths during the 2008 earthquake, was convicted for inciting subversion in his emailed
comments about the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. 69 In July
2010, Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist, was convicted of endangering state security as a result of his speaking to foreign
journalists. 70 This list could go on and Liu Xianbin, who was
recently arrested for inciting subversion, 71 is likely to be added
See The Verdict, supra note 3.
Xingfa (刑法) [Criminal Code] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1,
1997) art. 105 (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.
68 Profile: Chinese Dissent Hu Jia, BBC NEWS, (Dec. 17, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7662238.stm.
69 Lucy Hornby, China quake activist jailed for inciting subversion,
REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6180QA20100209.
70 Emma Graham-Harrison, China jails Uighur journalist for 15 Years:
Employer, REUTERS, July 23, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66M1PF20100723.
71 See Press Release, Human Rights in China, Case Update: Dissident
66
67
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to this list.
While the old “counterrevolution crimes” aimed at maintaining an ideological monopoly, the new “Endangering National Security” laws aim at maintaining the current status quo
and the party’s power monopoly regardless of whether the current leadership is still faithful to “socialism” and “the communist revolution.” With this new “subversion of state power” language added into the Criminal Code, any challenge against the
leading authority, whether it be anti-socialist or pro-socialist in
nature, can easily be dismissed as a violation of law. A true believer in communism can easily be found guilty under this law
as long as he publicly questions the party’s policies including
the market economy and the extension of party membership
eligibility to the business class. Interestingly and to some degree expectedly, in Mr. Liu’s case, the Court showed no interest
in addressing his argument where he compared his writings
with the political statements made by past high-ranking CCP
leaders. When put into historical and contemporary contexts,
these statements look as incriminating, if not more so, for the
purpose of subversion. 72 It is fair to say that the statute is
practically so effective in convicting dissidents that being
charged under this statute is almost in itself evidence sufficient
in proving that the purpose of the statute has been triggered,
i.e. the “state power” (the regime) is feeling threatened enough
to press charges. This is so for two reasons. First, the Court
has never failed to convict a defendant facing charges under
the “National Security Laws,” especially the “Inciting Subversion of State Power” statute. Second, the Court almost always
avoids adequate consideration of either the evidence or the defendant’s arguments.
Needless to say, had the Court maintained some degree of independence from political influence, a
Liu Xianbin Arrested on Suspicion of Inciting Subversion of State Power (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision_id=175028&item_id=175026.
72 See Statement of the Defendant, supra note 50 (“Each province in China should break away from the central government; they should divide into
27 nations, such as ‘the Republic of Anhui,’ ‘the Republic of Guangdong,’ and
‘the Republic of Taiwan.’” (quoting Letter from Mao Zedong on Arguments
Against Unification (Oct. 10, 1920); Mao Zedong, The Republic of Hunan-the
Essential Problem in Hunan’s Development, TA KUNG PAO, Sept. 3, 1920)).
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conviction under this vague and potentially unconstitutional
statute could be quite difficult. Unfortunately, with the Court
faithfully siding with the prosecutors in these cases, the reality
has proven to be the exact opposite.
IV. THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD STRIKES BACK
Through the Constitution’s design, the control over the judiciary, and the newly crafted “National Security Laws,” the
CCP appears to possess an arsenal of legal tools to effectively
suppress political dissent and maintain stability. This hardline approach to stability, however, is bound to put tremendous
pressure on every level of government as well as the grieving,
mistreated citizens, who are sharply increasing in number as a
result of economic growth and the enlarging gap between rich
and poor.
A hard-line approach to dealing with political dissidents
and public grievances as well as media censorship over the reporting of these events, often leads to a disguised sense of stability, while unresolved conflicts are merely temporarily suppressed. A peaceful career dissident like Mr. Liu, who lived in
a labor camp, endured police surveillance ever since 1989, and
now faces another eleven-year prison term, is a rarity in China
as well as in any society. 73 The vast majority of the grievances
against the Chinese Government today are each personal and
issue-specific rather than a general call for political and legal
reform. Many of these issues have nothing to do with an ideology nor challenge CCP leadership. Yet, the strong emphasis on
stability and maintaining a “harmonious society” requires the
government, often the local governments, to perceive a widespread grievance as a national security risk and suppress it at
any cost. Without any solid guidelines as to which rights are
guaranteed by the Constitution other than the superseding directive to create a harmonious society by, for example, always
preventing public assembly, governments at different levels
firmly hold a very inflexible attitude toward even the most
73 Pen American Center, China: Liu Xiaobo, http://www.pen.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/3029/prmID/172 (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
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peaceful form of public dissent. Such an inflexible approach
has created bizarre consequences, such as the “protest zones”
set up during the Beijing Olympics, for which all seventy-seven
applications for lawful protest within the zones were denied. 74
The applicants, including a seventy-nine-year-old woman, were
arrested and sentenced to reeducation labor camps for submitting these “applications in accordance with the government’s
own instructions.” 75 Protesting without a license is considered
illegal in China. After this “protest zone” incident, it is clear
that even following the proper, yet still arguably unconstitutional, procedure of filing an application for protest is no different than turning oneself in for a crime. Under these circumstances, public grievances can easily turn violent.
In recent years “[t]he number of mass protests has risen
rapidly, from 58,000 in 2003 to more than 74,000 in 2004 . . . .
According to the state media, over 1,800 police were injured
and 23 killed during protests in just the first nine months of
2005.” 76 This number, of course, does not include the mass protest in Tibet in 2008 and the violent unrest in Xinjiang, China
in 2009, which has been the deadliest protest since 1989. The
widespread tension created as a result of land disputes and
forced evictions has been a recurring episode in recent years.
In July 2010, ten thousand residents in Suzhou “clashed with
riot police” over a land dispute. 77 As much as the censorship
machine tries its best to prevent news of this kind from spreading, it is undeniable that the goal of creating a “harmonious society” has not been a successful one, especially when the term
“harmonious society” has often become the source of satire in
private life and cyberspace. 78
74 See Andrew Jacobs, Too Old and Frail to Re-Educate? Not In China,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2008, at A1, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/sports/olympics/21protest.html.
75 RICHARD KOMAIKO & BEIBEI QUE, LAWYERS IN MODERN CHINA 1 (2009).
76 Fu Yunlin & Randall Peerenboom, A New Analytical Framework for
Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 95, 109 (2010).
77 Thousands in Five-Day China Demo: Report, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(July 20, 2010), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/thousands-infiveday-china-demo-report-20100720-10i3b.html.
78 See Evan Osnos, Decoding Chinese Humor, NEW YORKER BLOG (June
17, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2009/06/de-
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A most troubling signal is that the legal system, especially
the judiciary, has played little part in reducing social unrest.
While helping the Government put away dissidents for drafting
articles or petitions as well as leaders of public protests for
“disruption social order,” the courts have failed to offer an
available remedy for grieving citizens, who feel wronged by the
Government or a private party having significant ties to the
Government. In his article, Randall Peerenboom argued for
the justification of limiting court access in some cases because
“the courts lacked the resources, competence, and stature to
provide effective relief … [and f]orcing the courts to handle
such cases had undermined the authority of the judiciary and
contributed to a sharp rise in petitions and mass protests.” 79
Yet, this argument may have overlooked the causal link between many of the mass protests and the court’s role. It is often not the case that the court lacks judicial competence, such
as a relevant statute, to adjudicate many of the disputes. Instead, in many cases, protests broke out after the court arbitrarily ruled in a certain way because of influence by the ruling
party or individual officials. In other cases, plaintiffs, who resorted to violent protests, did not even use the judicial system
knowing such an attempt would have been futile. Making the
courts an available, effective, and unbiased source for a remedy
does not mean that all disputes will be heard by them because
of limited resources. However, when a remedy is not available
from the judiciary or is virtually unattainable due to bias or
corruption, any settlement out of court is easily subject to manipulation and corruption. The aggrieved party in these settlements is more, rather than less, likely to resort to protest or
violence. For example, despite the fact that new laws and
regulations have been enacted due to rampant violence and, in
some cases, public suicides in forced evictions, the local court in
Wuxi, China announced the policy, off the record to all the litigants, that it would dismiss any case relating to disputes of
coding-chinese-humor.html.
79 Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: Common Myths
and Unfounded Assumptions, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA 69, 79
(2010).
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this nature. Disputes will not simply disappear when the court
refuses to hear them. They will, however, become the spark
that ignites the fire of social unrest.
V. CONCLUSION
If there is any long-lasting truth throughout human history, it is that people disagree with one another and this is not
likely to end any time soon. It is fair to say that there has never been a period in history, in any part of the world, where absolute “harmony” or “stability” has been achieved. Political
dissent, or any dissent in general, is here to stay.
China’s Constitution and the judiciary have traditionally
been the faithful guardians of the political status quo. After its
emergence on the international stage, China has modernized
its tools of political persecution. These tools have proven effective in every individual case. The Constitution has continued
on its path of serving the CCP, the judiciary has continued on
its path of faithfully maintaining the status quo, the amended
Criminal Code has abandoned its obsession with ideology and
become a pragmatic guardian of “state power.” This swift
hard-line approach to any sign that disrupts “harmony” is effective in crushing political dissidents, but it is also effective in
creating new dissidents by putting non-politically motivated
people into the general category of people who challenge “state
power.” This hard line approach puts all levels of government
on constant alert and puts the judiciary in an indecisive position where it has to constantly look to the CCP for direction.
Decades ago, the CCP’s confidence level depended on its ideological propaganda, and its open stance against the political offenders. Today, this level has dropped to covert trials and an
increasing degree of censorship, not for the sake of a powerful
ideology any more, but mainly for silencing the voices that may
shake its only means of survival - economic growth, which has
greatly benefited its interest groups.
If there is another long-lasting truth throughout human
history, it is probably that there is no such thing as a perpetually growing economic index. When a society’s means for releasing social tension, such as an independent judiciary and
the right to free speech and protest, are taken away, the socie-
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ty’s “stability” becomes a zero-sum game. Without any means
for peaceful and constructive political dissent, violent social
strife is a likely result. Social tensions have erupted in tens of
thousands of violent clashes each year as well as the five recent
incidents of school children stabbing cases. 80 To prevent the
current regime from following the fate of the old dynasties,
perhaps some form of “noise” must be tolerated in this “harmonious society.”

80 See Edward Wong, Fifth Deadly Attack on a School Haunts China,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/world/asia/13china.html?scp=1&sq=china%20school%2
0children%20kindergarten&st=cse.

